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1. Introduction
Every limited company*1 as a legal person needs special bodies to express its will and carry out its activi-
ties.*2 Though modern company law in all countries provides special bodies to represent and manage the 
company, the technical structure of these organs varies widely. 
In general, two diﬀ erent approaches are recognisable: either the company has a single body with several 
members, who exercise separate functions, or there are two diﬀ erent bodies with separated functions.*3 The 
so-called prototype for the one-tier system is the Anglo-American public limited company. Article 154 of the 
United Kingdom’s Companies Act 2006*4 stipulates that a private company must have at least one direc-
tor and a public company must have at least two directors. However, in legal literature it has been argued 
that, due to fl exible legal regulation, British companies can have diﬀ erent types of managing bodies, as the 
shareholders have the possibility to shape the management system as they like.*5 
ɲ In Estonia, similarly to other EU member states, there are two types of limited-liability companies: public limited company 
(aktsiaselts) and private limited company (osaühing). See also: M. Vutt. Aktsiaseltsi juhtimismudeli õiguslik reguleerimine 
[‘Legal regulation of the management model of a public limited company’], master’s thesis. Tartu ɳɱɱɷ, p. ɸ.
ɳ About the legal theories of a legal person, see, for example, K. Saare. Eraõigusliku juriidilise isiku õigussubjektsuse piirit-
lemine (Abgrenzung der Rechtssubjektivität der Privatrechtlichen Juristischen Person) [in English: Delimitation of the 
legal subjectivity of the private legal person], doctoral thesis. Tartu ɳɱɱɵ. 
ɴ There are also some countries within Europe that allow public limited companies to choose between the two models (e.g., 
France and Belgium). M. Vutt. Aktsiaseltsi juhtimismudeli õiguslik reguleerimine [‘Legal regulation of the management model 
of a public limited company], master’s thesis. Tartu ɳɱɱɷ, pp. ɳɹ, ɴɸ, ɺɸ–ɺɹ. 
ɵ UK Companies Act ɳɱɱɷ. Available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/ɳɱɱɷ/ɵɷ/contents. 
ɶ J. Rickford. Fundamentals, developments and trends in British company law – some wider refl ections. First part: Overview 
and the British approach. – European Company and Financial Law Review ɲ (ɳɱɱɵ) / ɵ (December), p. ɵɱɶ.
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The classic examples of a two-tier management model are Germany and the Netherlands. As com-
pared to the one-tier system, the two-tier model is a more recent phenomenon. The concept of a two-tier 
model is based on the idea of an independent supervision, which means that the control over the manage-
ment must be carried out by an independent and objective body that must be separated from the everyday 
management.*6 The managing bodies of the German public limited company (Aktiengesellschaft) are the 
management board (Vorstand) and supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat), both of which must be appointed 
by the founders of the company.*7 The everyday activities are carried out by the management board, and 
the task of the supervisory board is to control the activities of the management board in general. German 
private limited companies (Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung) normally have one-tier management 
structure,*8 but some special regulations deriving from co-determination rules can make the supervisory 
board compulsory also for smaller companies.*9 
An Estonian public limited company, similarly to the German Aktiengesellschaft, is managed by two 
separate bodies and the management model is to a great extent similar to the German one. According to 
Art. 243 (1) p 7 and Art. 316 of the Estonian Commercial Code*10, every public limited company must have 
a supervisory board. According to Art. 189 of the CC, a private limited company shall have a supervisory 
board if it is provided by the articles of association of the company. As Estonian law does not foresee any 
co-determination rules, the formation of a supervisory board is voluntary for all private limited compa-
nies.*11 In case shareholders decide to choose the two-tier model, the provisions of the CC concerning the 
super visory board of a public company apply correspondingly to the powers and activities of the supervisory 
board unless otherwise provided by law.
Though Estonian case law has had many examples of claims fi led against the members of the manage-
ment board, Estonian courts have only lately started solving cases where the members of the supervisory 
board have been sued for damaging the company. The main problem seems to arise from the fact that, 
although the general principles for the liability are very similar to those for liability of the management 
board, the functions and tasks of the supervisory board are diﬀ erent and therefore the assumptions about 
the liability are yet not clear. 
The article addresses the core question of the scope of the powers and obligations of the members of 
an Estonian public limited company’s supervisory board. The main research question is: whether and to 
what extent the relevant Estonian case law takes into account the special features of those obligations. The 
purpose of the research is to compare Estonian legal regulation and case law to the relevant German regula-
tions. The above-mentioned approach is justifi ed because the German public limited company, as well as its 
Estonian counterpart, has a two-tier management model.*12 
ɷ A.F. Conard. The supervision of corporate management: A comparison of developments in European Community and United 
States law. – Michigan Law Review ɹɳ (ɲɺɹɵ), pp. ɲɵɶɺ–ɲɵɹɹ.
ɸ See Art. ɴɱ of the Aktiengesetz (AktG; Aktiengesetz vom ɷ. September ɲɺɷɶ (BGBl. I S. ɲɱɹɺ), das durch Artikel ɹ des 
Gesetzes vom ɲɲ. April ɳɱɲɸ (BGBl. I S. ɹɱɳ) geändert worden ist. Available at https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/
aktg/).
ɹ See Art. ɶɳ of the German Gesetz betreﬀ end die Gesellschaften mit beschränkter Haftung GmbHG (GmbHG; Gesetz 
betreﬀ end die Gesellschaften mit beschränkter Haftung in der im Bundesgesetzblatt Teil III, Gliederungsnummer ɵɲɳɴ-ɲ, 
veröﬀ entlichten bereinigten Fassung, das zuletzt durch Artikel ɹ des Gesetzes vom ɲɱ. Mai ɳɱɲɷ (BGBl. I S. ɲɲɵɳ) geändert 
worden ist).
ɺ H. Fleischer, W. Goette (Herausg.). Münchener Kommentar zum GmbHG. Verlag C.H. Beck München. ɳ. Aufl age ɳɱɲɷ. – 
Spindler § ɶɳ, Rn. ɲɵ.
ɲɱ Commercial Code. Adopted on ɲɶ February ɲɺɺɶ. – RT I ɲɺɺɶ, ɳɷ/ɳɹ, ɴɶɶ; RT I ɳɳ.ɱɷ.ɳɱɲɷ (in Estonian). Hereinafter ‘CC’.
ɲɲ Until June ɲɺɺɷ, Art. ɲɹɺ (ɲ) of the CC stipulated that a supervisory board is compulsory for every private limited company 
that has share capital that exceeds ɵɱɱ,ɱɱɱ kroons, more than ɳɱ shareholders, or more than ɲɱɱ employees during an 
accounting year. Until ɲ January ɳɱɲɲ, a supervisory board was compulsory for every private limited company with share 
capital of more than ɳɶ,ɱɱɱ euros and with fewer than three members of the management board.  
ɲɳ The use of German law as a source for comparison can also be justifi ed by the view, expressed by the Supreme Court of Esto-
nia, that on many occasions the German legal system serves as a model not only for legal regulations but also, as an example 
for courts for the interpretation of the relevant law. See CCSCd ɴ-ɳ-ɲ-ɲɵɶ-ɱɵ, para. ɴɺ. 
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2. Functions and powers of the supervisory board: 
A comparative view
2.1. General duties of the supervisory board
According to law, the supervisory board of Estonian companies has three major functions: general manage-
ment of the company, planning of the economic activities of the company, and supervision of the activities 
of the management board. The general list is regulated in the fi rst sentence of Article 316 of the CC, which 
stipulates that the supervisory board shall plan the activities of the public limited company, organise the 
management of the company, and supervise the activities of the management board.
In addition to the above-mentioned generalised description of the duties of the supervisory board, some 
duties are also specifi ed in other articles of the CC. The duty of the strategic general management*13 arises 
from Article 317 of the CC, and as far as the shareholders have not determined the main directions of the 
activities with their decisions, it is the power of the supervisory board to conduct the general management. 
According to the fi rst sentence of Art. 317 of the CC, the supervisory board shall give orders to the management 
board for organisation of the management of the company. The second sentence of the same article stresses 
the power of the supervisory board to supervise the actions of the management board. According to this provi-
sion, all transactions that are beyond the scope of everyday economic activities, as a rule, require the consent 
of the supervisory board. In general, the consent of the supervisory body is required for conclusion of, above 
all, transactions that bring about the acquisition or termination of holdings in other companies, the founda-
tion or dissolution of subsidiaries, the acquisition or transfer of an enterprise or the termination of its activi-
ties, the transfer or encumbrance of immovable or registered movables, etc. One must note that the list of the 
transactions that require the consent of the supervisory board is an open one and serves as an example. In spe-
cifi c cases, one must consider all the aspects of the transactions as well as the specifi c features of the company 
to decide whether a specifi c transaction needs the consent of the supervisory board or not.*14 The Estonian 
Supreme Court has expressed a view that, in decision on whether a certain transaction needs consent of the 
supervisory board or not, the extent and the nature of such transactions must be taken into consideration.*15 
It is also important to note that the supervisory board shall also approve the annual budget of the 
company unless the power of deciding on such matters is granted to a general meeting by the articles of 
association (Art. 317 (7)).
However, the meaning and content of the duty to supervise and monitor the actions of the management 
board is not clearly stipulated in law. Art. 317 (7) CC foresees that the supervisory board has the right to 
obtain information concerning the activities of the company from the management board and to demand 
an activity report and preparation of a balance sheet. The law also foresees the right of each member of 
the supervisory board to demand the submission of reports and information to the supervisory board. An 
important feature of the powers of the supervisory board has also been described in Estonian legal lit-
erature: it has neither the competence nor the possibility of suspending the activities of the management 
board.*16
In addition to that, Art. 317 (6) of the CC stipulates that the supervisory board (as a body) has the right 
to examine all the documents of the company and to audit the accuracy of accounting, the existence of assets 
and the conformity of the activities of the company with the law, the articles of association, and resolutions 
of the general meeting. However, the law does not include the clear standard of supervision. One can con-
clude that those rights are granted in order to provide the supervisory board and its members the necessary 
information to fulfi l its general duties. The law prescribes neither the exact frequency at which the docu-
ments should be checked nor the extent or exact scope of the supervision. This means that the nature of the 
ɲɴ About the strategic management, see additionally K. Saare, U. Volens, A. Vutt, M. Vutt. Ühinguõigus I. Kapitaliühingud 
[‘Company Law I: Limited Companies’]. Tallinn: Juura ɳɱɲɶ, mn. ɲɹɵɷ.
ɲɵ According to Art. ɴɲɸ (ɳ), the articles of association may, however, prescribe that the consent of the supervisory board shall 
not be required or is required only in the cases specifi ed in the articles. The articles of association may also prescribe other 
transactions for the conclusion of which the consent of the supervisory board is required. The articles of association may also 
grant the supervisory board the right to decide on other issues that are not placed within the competence of the management 
board or the general meeting pursuant to law or the articles of association.
ɲɶ CCSCd ɴ-ɳ-ɲ-ɺ-ɲɷ, para. ɴɷ; CCSCd ɴ-ɳ-ɲ-ɳɷ-ɲɸ, para. ɲɴ.
ɲɷ K. Saare et al. (Note ɲɴ), mn. ɲɹɷɵ.
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control the supervisory board carries out is diﬀ erent from that of the control carried out by the auditors of 
the company.
Unlike the management board, being a body that carries out everyday activities and not being obliged 
to hold meetings, the supervisory board must hold regular meetings. According to Art. 321 (1) of the CC, 
meetings of a supervisory board shall be held when necessary but not less frequently than once every three 
months.
As for the supervisory board of a German public limited company, it has traditionally been considered 
mainly as a controlling body – Art. 111 (1) of the AktG stipulates that a supervisory board must supervise 
the management board. Under German company law, the supervisory board, similarly to the supervisory 
board of Estonian limited companies, has several other obligations too. The main rights and duties of the 
supervisory board are stipulated in Art. 111 of the AktG, but the law also includes many other regulations, 
which supplement this list. For example, according to Art. 77 (2) of the AktG, the supervisory board has the 
right to adopt the rules of procedure for the management board (Art. 77 (2) AktG). According to Art. 90 of 
the AktG, it can demand that the management board should compose the management report. According 
to Art. 171 of the AktG, the supervisory board controls the annual fi nancial statements, management report, 
and proposal for the profi t distribution. 
Unlike Estonian law, the German AktG clearly distinguishes between the duties of the management 
board and the supervisory board. Art. 111 (4) of the AktG stipulates the prohibition to transfer the powers 
of the management board to the supervisory board. It has been expressed in German legal literature that 
the clear distinction and organisational diﬀ erentiation between the competence to take decisions as regards 
everyday actions and to supervise those actions derives from the idea that each of the bodies acts indepen-
dently and is separately responsible for fulfi lling its obligations.*17 However, the articles of association of the 
company may determine that certain types of transactions may need the consent of the supervisory board. 
This is considered as a possibility for the supervisory board to participate in managing the company and 
therefore directly aﬀ ect the management decisions (in addition to the possibility of advising the manage-
ment board).*18 Under German law, it is the supervisory board as a body (a collective entity) that performs 
the functions and carries the responsibility foreseen in law and not its single members. That means that, 
in general, it is not possible to delegate any of those obligations to a special committee or a single member 
of the supervisory board. However, it is possible for some actual monitoring activities to be carried out by 
special committees of the supervisory board.*19
2.2. Standard of supervision
In Estonian legal literature, the standard for fulfi lling the duties of the supervisory board has not yet been 
discussed. In German legal literature, on the other hand, it has been expressed that the law does not require 
the supervisory board to monitor all the actions of the management board in detail.*20 The supervision is 
considered suﬃ  cient and reasonable when the supervisory board:
– takes notice of all the reports and information it gets from the management board as well as of the 
developments and business events that are disclosed by the management board;
– fulfi ls its obligation to check the annual accounts of a company as well as the reports the manage-
ment board has presented to the supervisory board about the business relations with aﬃ  liated com-
panies;
– is convinced that the management board is properly composed and its members are appropriate for 
fulfi lling their obligations; 
– is convinced that the members of the management board co-operate properly and that all the 
 management tools, (i.e., business planning, accounting, and reporting), as well as the company’s 
organisation, meet the requirements;  
ɲɸ W. Goette, M. Habersack, S. Kalss. Münchener Kommentar zum AktG. Verlag C.H. Beck München.  ɵ. Aufl age ɳɱɲɵ. – Haber-
sack, AktG § ɲɲɲ Rn. ɺɷ.
ɲɹ Ibid. Rn. ɺɷ.
ɲɺ Ibid. Rn. ɵɺ.
ɳɱ W. Hölters (Hrsg). Aktiengesetz. Kommentar. Verlag C.H. Beck München.  ɳ. Aufl age ɳɱɲɵ. – Hambloch-gesinn/gesinn, 
Rn ɲɲ.
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– ensures that the management board fully complies with its reporting obligation pursuant to Art. 90 
of the AktG;*21
– is able to trace all the indications that might lead the management board to a violation of its duties;
– in any case of signifi cant deviations from the planned development, as well as in the event of any 
signifi cant deterioration in earnings and assets, or in the case of material deviations as regards 
those indicators in comparable companies, examines whether those deviations are justifi ed and 
whether the management board responds adequately.*22 
Whether and to what extent the supervisory board may rely solely on the information of the management 
board is, however, disputable. There are diﬀ erent opinions in German legal literature about the question 
of whether monitoring actions of the supervisory board should be extended to subordinate levels where 
the management decisions are taken.*23 Some authors are of the opinion that suﬃ  cient monitoring means, 
in general, that the supervisory board diligently monitors the annual (consolidated) fi nancial statements 
and the management and auditor’s reports and discusses and evaluates the management of the company 
critically with the management board.*24 Some authors explain that the supervisory board must, for its 
part, carry out information-gathering activities to examine the management’s actions. However, it has been 
stressed that the supervisory board is obliged to investigate the management’s actions only if the manage-
ment reports are unclear, incomplete, or identifi ably incorrect or if there are credible indications of mis-
conduct of the members of the management board.*25 It has also been noted that the supervisory board 
must adjust the intensity of its monitoring to the situation of the company.*26 The supervisory board has an 
obligation to interfere, which means that if it discovers a breach of the management’s obligations, it must 
intervene and at least prompt the management board to act in a proper manner. An individual member 
of the supervisory board who has the appropriate evidence must ensure that the supervisory board or the 
responsible person deals with the matter.*27
It has been expressed that when the company is in crisis, but also in cases of mergers and acquisitions, 
the members of the supervisory board must act and take part in decision-making more actively.*28 In gen-
eral, the supervisory board is allowed to rely on the information it gets from the management board, but it 
must ensure the existence of adequate organisation of the reporting system and intensify the monitoring 
when particular circumstances arise – for example, if there are any indications that the existence of the 
company is threatened.*29 After insolvency has become evident, the members of the management board are 
not allowed to make payments on behalf of the company and must fi le for bankruptcy. Has the supervisory 
board discovered that the company is insolvent, it must co-act in order to make sure the management board 
fi les the bankruptcy application. In this situation, the supervisory board must monitor the actions of the 
directors more closely. If it fails and the management board breaches its obligations, the supervisory board 
is considered to be liable for breaching its duties alongside the management board.*30
The law does not provide for the supervisory board’s consent to carry out specifi c actions, but this can be 
foreseen in the articles of association or in other internal regulations. It has been expressed in legal literature 
that all transactions that are considered particularly important still need the supervisory board’s approval.*31 
ɳɲ Art. ɺɱ of AktG stipulates the list of diﬀ erent reports the management board is obliged to present to the supervisory board. 
They include e.g reports about the intended business policy of the company, fundamental questions of business planning 
(in particular fi nancial, investment and personnel planning), profi tability of the company (in particular the profi tability of 
its equity), the course of business, the situation of the company as a whole, and transactions which can be of considerable 
importance for the profi tability or liquidity of the company.
ɳɳ W. Hölters (Note ɳɱ). – Hambloch-gesinn/gesinn, Rn ɲɲ. 
ɳɴ U. Hüﬀ er, J. Koch. Beck’scher Kurz-Kommentare. Band ɶɴ. Aktiengesetz.  Verlag C.H. Beck München,ɲɳ. Aufl age ɳɱɲɷ. – 
Koch, § ɲɲɲ, Rn ɵ.
ɳɵ W. Goette, M. Habersack, S. Kalss (Note ɲɸ). – Habersack, AktG § ɲɲɲ Rn ɵɵ.
ɳɶ W. Hölters (Note ɳɱ). – Hambloch-gesinn/gesinn, Rn ɲɲ.
ɳɷ W. Goette, M. Habersack, S. Kalss (Note ɲɸ). – Habersack, AktG § ɲɲɲ Rn ɵɵ.
ɳɸ W. Goette, M. Habersack, S. Kalss (Note ɲɸ). – Habersack, AktG § ɲɲɷ Rn. ɴɴ.
ɳɹ W. Goette, M. Habersack, S. Kalss (Note ɲɸ). – Habersack, AktG § ɲɲɷ Rn ɴɸ.
ɳɺ U. Hüﬀ er, J. Koch (Note ɳɴ). – Hüﬀ er AktG § ɲɲɷ Rn. ɲɶ. 
ɴɱ BGH: Geltung des Zahlungsverbots ab Eintritt der Insolvenzreife. – NZG ɳɱɱɺ, ɶɶɱ. BGH, Urteil vom ɲɷ. ɴ. ɳɱɱɺ - II ZR 
ɳɹɱ/ɱɸ (OLG Dresden). 
ɴɲ U. Hüﬀ er. Gesellschaftsrecht. ɸ. Aufl age. Verlag C.H. Beck ɳɱɱɸ, S ɳɹɶ; U. Hüﬀ er, J. Koch (Note ɳɴ). – Hüﬀ er, Koch, § ɲɲɲ, 
Rn ɵɶ.
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According to German legal literature, in case an upcoming decision of a supervisory board can be con-
sidered unjustifi able and unacceptable, any diligent member of a supervisory board is not only obliged to 
vote against it but also has an obligation to explicitly reject the decision and point out reservations, depend-
ing on the circumstances of the individual case. If the management board acts recognisably unlawfully, 
every single member of the supervisory board must be active and initiate convocation of the supervisory 
board’s meeting.*32 It has also been argued that the main problem as regards the standard of supervision is 
the level of information the supervisory board must have. It cannot be expected that the supervisory board 
monitors the management board continuously in the sense that it checks all the individual transactions, 
income and accounting documents.*33 German case law has expressed the view that diligent supervisory 
board members are not actually expected to prevent every risky business as risky transactions are part of 
normal business life.*34
2.3. Legal regulation of the liability of the members 
of the supervisory board
The main principle of the liability of a member of the supervisory board of an Estonian public limited com-
pany is regulated in Art. 327 (2) of the CC, and according to this provision the members of the supervisory 
board who cause damage to the company by violation of their obligations shall be jointly and severally liable 
for compensation for the damage caused. The law also foresees that a member of the supervisory board is 
released from liability if he proves that he has performed his obligations with due diligence. When compar-
ing the above-mentioned regulations with the provisions that foresee the liability of the directors, one can 
notice that those regulations are almost identical. In Estonian legal literature, the liability of the members 
of the supervisory board has been explained similarly to the liability of the members of the management 
board.*35 This raises the question of how one can distinguish the liability of the supervisory board from the 
liability of the directors and whether it is enough to ascertain that the directors have breached their duties 
in order to hold the members of the supervisory board liable as well. 
The legal provisions on the liability of the members of the supervisory board of a German Aktien-
gesellschaft are very similar to the regulations of the Estonian CC. Art 116 (1) of the AktG stipulates that, as 
regards the duty of care and the liability of the members of the supervisory board, Art. 93 of the AktG, which 
regulates the duty of care and the liability of the management board, applies mutatis mutandis.*36 The law 
emphasises that the members of the supervisory board are, in particular, obliged to maintain confi dential-
ity of confi dential reports and confi dential consultations. The law also stipulates that the members of the 
management board are, in particular, obliged to compensate for the damage that arises from unreasonable 
remuneration. 
In German legal literature, it has also been explained that, though the provisions that regulate the liabil-
ity of the directors are applicable in cases of liability of the members of the supervisory board, there are still 
lots of diﬀ erences between them. Namely, the tasks, the structure of the obligations, and activities must be 
taken into account in the ‘appropriate’ application of those regulations.*37 
The main prerequisite for the liability of a member of a supervisory board is the breach of his obligations. 
German legal literature emphasises that, though the breach of duty is a necessary precondition for the liability, 
it is not the only one, and in order for a member of the supervisory board to be held liable, the damage must 
occur to the company and the damage must be caused by the breach of obligations of the member of the super-
visory board. Therefore, an individual member of the supervisory board cannot be held liable if the majority 
of the supervisory board behave in accordance with their duties and take a decision that is fully in accordance 
ɴɳ M. Henssler. L. Strohn. Gesellschaftsrecht. Beck’sche Kurzkommentare. ɴ. Aufl age. Verlag C. H. Beck, München ɳɱɲɷ. – 
Henssler AktG § ɲɲɷ Rn. ɲɲ.
ɴɴ Reichard: Darlegungs- und Beweislast im Schadensersatzprozess gegen Aufsichtsratsmitglied. OLG Stuttgart, Beschluss vom 
ɲɺ.ɱɷ.ɳɱɲɳ – ɳɱ W ɲ/ɲɳ, rechtskräftig (LG Tübingen), BeckRS ɳɱɲɳ, ɲɵɲɳɷ. – GWR ɳɱɲɳ, ɵɺɲ.
ɴɵ BGH: Haftung eines Verwaltungsratsmitglieds in einer Massengesellschaft. – NJW ɲɺɸɸ, ɳɴɲɳ. BGH, Urteil vom ɵ. ɸ. 
ɲɺɸɸ – II ZR ɲɶɱ/ɸɶ.
ɴɶ K. Saare et al. (Note ɲɴ), mn. ɲɹɹɷ–ɲɹɺɱ.
ɴɷ The only exception is that the regulations about the insurance of the management board members against risks arising from 
their professional activities do not apply.
ɴɸ U. Hüﬀ er, J. Koch (Note ɳɴ). – Hüﬀ er, § ɲɲɷ, Rn ɲ.
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with the company’s interest.*38 All the members of the supervisory board must act in accordance with the min-
imum standard of care, but when an individual member has special knowledge, he is subject to an increased 
level of care, as far as his speciality is concerned.*39 In addition to that, a higher level of care is expected from 
the chairman of the supervisory board, which is often refl ected in correspondingly greater remuneration.*40
It can be concluded that, though German legal regulation as regards the powers and obligations of the 
supervisory board is more detailed than Estonian, there is no fundamental diﬀ erence between German and 
Estonian laws in that respect. The authors are therefore of the opinion that, in consideration of the essential 
similarity between the management systems of Estonian and German public limited companies, similar 
interpretation of the scope of the obligations of the supervisory board members would be justifi ed. It is 
important to note that Estonian legal practice should defi nitely avoid setting signifi cantly higher standards 
when interpreting the scope of those obligations.
3. The liability of the members of the supervisory board: 
German vs Estonian case law
When one analyses the powers and duties of the members of the supervisory board, a question arises: what 
might be the specifi c cases when the members of the supervisory board can be held liable for causing dam-
age to the company? Is it possible that the directors of the company are not liable but the members of the 
supervisory still are?
German case law knows several examples of situations wherein the members of the supervisory board 
have been held liable for the damage caused to the company. For example, the liability has followed in cases 
of the supervisory board’s inactivity in a situation in which the management board acted unusually care-
lessly, in cases of giving consent for an under-value sales agreement on the main real estate of the company 
although the actual value of the property could have been easily ascertained, etc.*41 
German case law is also of the opinion that in the case of transactions that are of particular importance 
to the company because of their scope, the risks associated with them, or their strategic function for the 
company, each member of the supervisory board must record the relevant facts and form his own judge-
ment. This also includes a regular risk analysis.*42
The supervisory board members have also been held liable when suggesting that the management board 
should conclude a detrimental transaction without any legal or commercial justifi cation. The same has hap-
pened when the members of the supervisory board had exercised their duties without having a proper idea 
about the actions of the company that was acting mainly abroad.*43
German case law has also taken a view that a member of a supervisory board who endangers the cred-
itworthiness of the company by publicly making harsh remarks about an intra-company confl ict violates his 
duty of loyalty.*44
The foregoing analysis shows that German case law has developed versatile practice in the application 
of the liability of members of the supervisory board. For Estonian case law, however, the issues related to 
the liability of the supervisory board are still relatively new.
The Estonian Supreme Court has nevertheless recently made two decisions as regards the liability of the 
supervisory board members, but the authors of this paper are of the opinion that the standard of diligence 
and the meaning of ‘proper supervision’ have still remained unclear.
The two cases had similar starting points: the claim of a bankrupted company was fi led against both 
management and supervisory board members. The insolvency administrator, who was acting on behalf of 
ɴɹ W. Goette, M. Habersack, S. Kalss (Note ɲɸ). – Habersack, AktG § ɲɲɷ Rn. ɳɺ.
ɴɺ BGH: Haftung des Vorstands und des Aufsichtsrats einer Aktiengesellschaft. –  CCZ ɳɱɲɳ, ɸɷ. BGH, Urteil vom ɳɱ. ɺ. ɳɱɲɲ – 
II ZR ɳɴɵ/ɱɺ.
ɵɱ W. Goette, M. Habersack, S. Kalss (Note ɲɸ). – Habersack, AktG § ɲɲɷ Rn. ɴɸ.
ɵɲ U. Hüﬀ er, J. Koch (Note ɳɴ). – Hüﬀ er AktG § ɲɲɷ Rn. ɲɸ.
ɵɳ D. Lorenz: Pfl icht zur eigenständigen Risikoanalyse für Aufsichtsräte – Piëch.  – GWR ɳɱɲɳ, ɲɶɷ. OLG Stuttgart, Urteil vom 
ɳɺ.ɱɳ.ɳɱɲɳ – ɳɱ U ɴ/ɲɲ (LG Stuttgart).
ɵɴ This decision is, however, considered problematic. See U. Hüﬀ er, J. Koch (Note ɳɴ). – Hüﬀ er AktG § ɲɲɷ Rn. ɲɸ.
ɵɵ D. Lorenz (Note ɵɳ).
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the company,*45 claimed that the members of the management board as well as the supervisory board had 
breached their obligations and thereby caused damage to the company. In both cases, the main action that 
was considered as a breach of duty of the directors was transferring either all of the assets of the company or 
a signifi cant part of it to another person. Such transactions were allegedly concluded without the company 
getting proper exchange.
In the fi rst of the above-mentioned cases,*46 the insolvency administrator alleged that the director and 
three members of the supervisory board had breached their obligations and that this breach had resulted 
in three kinds of damage: the company lost, fi rstly, its cash; secondly, the main property; and, thirdly, the 
turnover. The insolvency administrator claimed that the supervisory board had allegedly appointed a direc-
tor who later was not diligent enough and that the members of the supervisory board did not fulfi l their 
obligation of proper supervision as they did not check the use of the assets of the company. The county court 
satisfi ed the action against all the defendants and was of the opinion that it was the supervisory board’s 
inactivity that had partly caused the damage.*47 At the appeal court, the action remained satisfi ed against 
the members of the management board with regard to the damage caused by the loss of cash and property. 
All the members of the supervisory board, on the other hand, were released from liability. The district court 
explained that the functions of management and supervisory boards are diﬀ erent as the management board 
performs its tasks and carries out daily business under its own responsibility and the supervisory board has 
no right to interfere. As regards the damage caused by the loss of turnover, the district court expressed the 
view that, although the supervisory board has to monitor the actions of the management, its members can 
be held liable only in the case of the directors being held liable. The district court also stressed that there was 
no causal link between the company’s damage and the appointment of the new director.*48
The Supreme Court annulled the decision of the district court as regards the claim arising from the dam-
age caused by the loss of turnover and referred the case partially back to the district court for a new hearing. 
The Supreme Court was of the opinion that the possible liability of the director arising from the loss of turn-
over should be investigated more thoroughly and the question of whether the members of the supervisory 
board could be held liable for the same damage should be reviewed as well. The Supreme Court agreed with 
the district court, however, that, as a rule, the members of the supervisory board can be held liable only in 
cases wherein the members of the management board have breached their obligations.*49 Unfortunately, 
the Supreme Court did not give instructions or interpretations related to the actual standard of duty or the 
scope of obligations of the supervisory board members. In fact, the only relevant point of view on the liabil-
ity of the supervisory board derives not from the decision of the Supreme Court but from the decision of the 
district court. Therefore, although the case could be considered as conceptional, the Supreme Court failed to 
develop Estonian company law in a fi eld that can be considered fundamentally important for development 
of uniform judicial practice. One can only conclude that if the management board’s behaviour does not 
cause damage to the company, the liability of the supervisory board is also out of the question, regardless of 
whether the members of the supervisory board have been acting diligently or not. 
In the second case,*50 the insolvency administrator claimed that the members of the management board 
had breached their obligations by selling the main property of the company to a third party. The sales agree-
ment stipulated that the purchase price would be paid a year and a half after transfer of the assets. No war-
ranties or pledges were established. The insolvency administrator was of the opinion that such actions were 
not in accordance with the business judgement rule and that the transaction was economically unjustifi ed. 
He claimed that approving such a transaction meant that the members of the supervisory board had also 
violated their duty of care and caused the same damage alongside board members. The administrator also 
declared that the members of the supervisory board had breached their obligations, as they did not monitor 
the activities of the management board to a suﬃ  cient extent. Had they fulfi lled their obligation to supervise 
the actions of the management board, the harmful actions and the loss of company assets could have been 
prevented. The members of the supervisory board argued that they could not be held liable for the actions 
ɵɶ According to Art. ɴɲɶ (ɵ) and Art. ɴɳɸ (ɵ), in the case of declaration of bankruptcy of a company, only an insolvency admin-
istrator has a right to fi le a claim on behalf of the company.
ɵɷ CCSC ɴ-ɳ-ɲ-ɲɲɴ-ɲɷ.
ɵɸ CCSC ɴ-ɳ-ɲ-ɲɲɴ-ɲɷ, para. ɷ.
ɵɹ CCSC ɴ-ɳ-ɲ-ɲɲɴ-ɲɷ, para. ɺ.
ɵɺ CCSC ɴ-ɳ-ɲ-ɲɲɴ-ɲɷ, para. ɳɶ.
ɶɱ CCSCd ɴ-ɳ-ɲ-ɲɶɳ-ɲɷ.
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of the management board as they had no knowledge of the allegedly harmful transaction and that the super-
visory board has no general duty to control all the actions of the management board. 
The courts of the fi rst two instances ascertained that the supervisory board as a body had never taken 
any decision as regards those questionable transactions. The Supreme Court explained that, as the super-
visory board had never passed a resolution approving the harmful transaction, it actually never directly 
decided to conclude it.*51 The Supreme Court nevertheless emphasised that individual members of the 
supervisory board could still have breached their duties if they knew that the management board was about 
to conclude a harmful transaction but did not take any actions to call a meeting of the supervisory board 
(either through the chairman or directly).*52 
The Supreme Court also stressed that the members of the supervisory board could not be held liable 
only because they were aware of the harmful transaction that the members of the management board had 
concluded. The Supreme Court annulled the decision of the appeal instance and referred the case back to 
the district court for a new hearing. The Supreme Court instructed the district court that on the new hear-
ing, it should ascertain whether the defendants had had the possibility of taking steps to prevent the damag-
ing transaction being concluded and that if they had had the possibility of avoiding the damage, they should 
be held liable for the consequences.*53 
The Supreme Court justifi ed the annulment of the decision of the court of appeal with the fact that the 
appeal court allegedly failed to consider whether the defendant as a member of the supervisory board was 
aware of the harmful nature of the transaction. The Supreme Court also noted that if he had had the above-
mentioned knowledge, he should have exercised the supervision more diligently. 
In general, this approach can be considered justifi ed, but the authors of the article are of the opinion 
that the above-mentioned reasoning of the Supreme Court and the instructions given to the court of appeal 
for a new hearing seem to be contradictory. On the one hand, the Supreme Court explains that no member 
of a supervisory board can be held liable only on the basis of an accusation that he has not provided enough 
supervision of the actions of the management board. On the other hand, the Supreme Court orders the court 
of appeal to ascertain whether the members of the supervisory board could have prevented the harmful 
actions (meaning whether they had provided enough supervision). 
The authors of the article note that in assessment of breach by both management and supervisory board 
members, the main principle is that one cannot conclude that a director or a member of the supervisory 
board breached his obligations only because the outcome was negative. Any court decision must include 
the explanations of those diﬀ erences, and if the court fi nds that a director has breached his duties, the 
court should explain how the defendant should have been acting instead.*54 The question has a member of 
a supervisory board fulfi lled his obligations or violated them cannot be adequately assessed by looking for 
an answer to the abstract question of whether the supervision was suﬃ  cient. Although the case is still pend-
ing, the Supreme Court should have given some guidelines to the district court as regards the application 
of business judgement rule when establishing the liability of the supervisory board members. When assess-
ing the fulfi lment of the obligations and establishing the infringement by the members of the supervisory 
board, one must compare the standard of action (i.e., what the members of the supervisory board should 
have done) to the actual steps taken (i.e., what they actually did).*55
The authors of the article are of the opinion that ‘insuﬃ  cient supervision’ itself is not a breach of duties. 
The actual breach that should be assessed in discussion of the possibility of holding the supervisory board 
liable is an improper action taken by the supervisory board, or inactivity when it should have acted instead. 
ɶɲ CCSCd ɴ-ɳ-ɲ-ɲɶɳ-ɲɷ, para. ɲɸ.
ɶɳ According to Art. ɴɳɲ (ɲ) of the CC, a meeting of the supervisory board shall be called by the chairman of the supervisory 
board or by a member of the supervisory board substituting for the chairman.
ɶɴ CCSCd ɴ-ɳ-ɲ-ɲɶɳ-ɲɷ, para. ɲɺ.
ɶɵ The general obligation of proper reasoning for the court decision derives from Art. ɵɴɷ (ɲ) of the Estonian Code of Civil 
Procedure (Code of Civil Procedure, adopted on ɳɱ.ɵ.ɳɱɱɶ. – RT I ɳɱɱɶ, ɳɷ, ɲɺɸ; RT I, ɳɹ.ɲɳ.ɳɱɲɷ), which stipulates that 
a court judgement shall be lawful and reasoned. The requirement of reasoning means that the judicial reasoning must be 
understandable, traceable, and associated with the circumstances that have been identifi ed by the court in this specifi c matter. 
This specifi c procedural requirement of judicial decisions as a prerogative of a lawful court decision has been several times 
expressed in Estonian case law: see, for instance, CCSCd ɴ-ɳ-ɲ-ɲɴ-ɲɸ, para. ɲɶ; CCSCd ɴ-ɳ-ɲ-ɵɳ-ɲɷ, para. ɲɴ-ɲɶ; CCSCr 
ɴ-ɳ-ɲ-ɸɱ-ɲɶ, para. ɳɱ; CCSCd ɴ-ɳ-ɲ-ɲɳɺ-ɲɶ, para. ɲɶ, etc. 
ɶɶ The same principle is applicable in assessment of breach of duties of the member of the management board (see CCSCd 
ɴ-ɳ-ɲ-ɲɳɺ-ɲɶ, para. ɲɶ).
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The breach of one’s duties can be considered as a ‘performance gap’, and it can only be ascertained via 
comparing the actions taken to those that should have been taken. The main principle about the liability of 
the members of the supervisory board cannot be ascertained signifi cantly diﬀ erently from that about the 
liability of the directors.
4. Conclusions
The authors are of the opinion that neither of those two decisions of the Supreme Court as a matter of fact 
answers to the question, what is the actual liability standard of a member of a supervisory board. Both deci-
sions lack the proper application of the business judgement rule, and this approach contradicts the previous 
approach the Supreme Court has taken when assessing breach of duties of the directors. It is important to 
note that the breach of duties by a member of a supervisory board as well as by a director can be established 
only by comparing the obligation with the actual behaviour of the person in question. The above-mentioned 
decisions might therefore give the false impression that the fact that a director has breached his obligations 
means automatically that the members of a supervisory board must have also breached their obligations, 
as obviously the supervision has not been suﬃ  cient. This conclusion is however unjustifi able – the breach 
of the obligations of the management board cannot be considered as the only prerequisite of the liability of 
the supervisory board. 
The analysis also showed that the powers and obligations of the supervisory board of Estonian and 
German public limited companies are quite similar and therefore it would be reasonable to take the view-
points expressed in German legal literature and case law at least as a general example when interpreting 
Estonian legal regulations. One can therefore conclude that the breach of duties of the supervisory board 
must be assessed separately, with application of the business judgement rule similarly to that in the situa-
tion wherein breach of duties of the directors is assessed. The law does not require the supervisory board to 
monitor all the actions of the management board in detail, and the standard of supervision depends heavily 
on the circumstances. In the case of the directors of the company having breached their duties, this might 
but does not necessarily mean that the members of the supervisory board have breached their duties as well.
